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IS THERE ANYBODY WHO REALLY WANTS TO 
LIVE FOREVER?
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MORTALITY
To the Memory of Burt
There was no such person before and never will be again; God 
will not repeat this. Other people will surely come; a world that 
will never grow weary, and there will be brought forth many 
different persons, maybe better, maybe worse, but never, never-
more – the same (J. Michelet, epitaph for the Duke of Orleans).1
Introduction: the curse of immortality
From ancient times many philosophers have considered the question of wheth-
er it is a bad thing to die. In this essay I would like to concentrate on the question, 
of whether it would be a good thing not to die. The idea of achieving immortality 
has been present in human speculation since the dawn of history. Furthermore, 
this dream has resurfaced not only in the idle speculation of humans but also in 
scientifi c research. Alchemists who put all their effort into fi nding the elixir of 
immortality have been replaced in our times by scientists who aim at creating 
a brave new world where people would be able to fully control the act of human 
birth and death by scientifi c methods. However, is immortality really something 
worth desiring? 
I think that the average person would answer negatively to the question given 
in the title of the essay. We can fi nd some vivid depictions which illustrate our fear 
of a never ending life in literature, where writers such as George Bernard Shaw 
or Jonathan Swift present the tragedy of the impossibility of fi nding death. One 
of the most moving illustrations of the problem comes from The Makropulos Case 
1  J. Michelet, Historie de France. Le Moyen Age, R. Laffont, Paris 1981, p. 629 (I quote after 
A. Finkielkraut, Zagubione człowieczeństwo. Esej o XX wieku (L’Humanité Perdue. Essai sur le 
XXE siécle), M. Fabianowski (trans.), Warszawa 1999, p. 86). 
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(Affair) (fi rst published in 1922) – a play written by the Czech writer Karel Čapek 
which was turned into an opera by the Czech composer Leoš Janáček.2 This is 
the tragic story of Elina Makropulos (allias Elina Marty or Ellian MacGregor), 
a famous opera singer who was born in 1585 and died in 1922 at the age of 337. 
She was the daughter of the alchemist Hieronymus, who lived in Prague at the 
end of the 16th century at the court of Emperor Rudolf II. Emperor Rudolf craved 
fanatically to become immortal and spent lots of his wealth and power on search-
ing for a magic formula which could make it possible. He engaged hundreds of 
alchemists and physicians, with Hieronymus, Elina’s father, among them, to re-
alize this aim. Finally, Hieronymus invented a potion that would extend life by 
three centuries but Rudolf, who was very suspicious and wanted to be sure that 
this elixir was not poison, ordered him to test it on his daughter Elina. She fell 
into a coma and Hieronymus was sent to prison. However, after a week Elina 
awoke and fl ed with the formula, starting a new, extremely long life. She trav-
elled around the world and became one of the best singers of all time yet her life 
became so long that it lost its meaning for her. After 300 years of intensive living, 
she could not love any more, feel or enjoy anything – she had experienced so much 
that everything became boring for her and she became completely indifferent 
about life. After 300 years, when she needed to take the elixir again to survive 
another 300 years, she refused to do so saying: “Life should not last too long – 
that way it keeps its value”. After she died, nobody wanted to take the magic 
formula and try themselves and thus it was destroyed forever. 
A very similar example of the curse of mortality is given in a fascinating short 
story The Immortal written by Jorge Luis Borges. The hero of the story under-
took many attempts to fi nd the immortal city with the river that guarantees im-
mortality to each of those who drink water from it. However, when he achieved 
immortality, it turned out that his life became a frustrating torture deprived of 
any sense. Just as with the 300 year old Elina, the immortal hero of the story 
found boredom and real tragedy in a life that lasts so long that you can experi-
ence everything. A life that cannot end lost its meaning for the hero who spent 
ages searching for another river with water that would bring him back mortality. 
The stories presented above tells us one very important thing – that death 
is a signifi cant part of the human condition without which we cannot fully un-
derstand a human being – her life, passions and desires. I would like to con-
sider what makes death so signifi cant in understanding ourselves. I shall argue 
that death gives sense and meaning to our life or as Vladimir Jankélévitch says: 
“Death is nonsense that gives sense to life.”3 Such an idea seems to be especially 
important to discuss in our times when both the sense of death and the sense of 
the lives of humans seems to be being undermined. 
2  See an inspiring philosophical essay written on this topic by Bernard Williams The Ma-
kropulos Case: Refl ections on the Tedium of Immortality [in:] Ile wolności powinna mieć wola 
i inne eseje z fi lozofi i moralnej (How Much Freedom Should the Will Have and Other Essays in 
Moral Philosophy), T. Baszniak (trans.), ALETHEIA, Warszawa 1999, pp. 43–64.
3  V. Jankélévitch, To co nieuchronne. Rozmowy o śmierci (Penser la Mort?), M. Kwaterko 
(trans.), PIW, Warszawa 2005, p. 35.
135
The sense and meaning of death
People are not only mortal, they are also conscious that they are mortal and it 
makes a signifi cant difference in the way they understand and experience their 
lives. In talking about death we can have in mind three different meanings of 
death – “death in the third person” (the death of other, known or unknown peo-
ple), “death in the second person” (death of our loved ones) and “death in the fi rst 
person” (our death).4 Only in the fi rst two situations can we consider the experi-
ence of death. However, it is a completely different experience in both of them 
since the death of loved ones is connected with one of the deepest tragedies in our 
life – the feeling of their absence which is the feeling of emptiness that cannot 
ever be fi lled in any way.5 As Simone Weil says, “Among human beings, only the 
existence of those we love is fully recognized,”6 thus the death of those we love can 
be fully experienced. We cannot experience our own death since “when we exist 
death is not, and when death exists, we are not any more”7 as the famous state-
ment of Epicurus says. Since we do not know anything about existence before or 
after death, it is more accurate to say that we cannot experience death because to 
experience something means for us to be alive, as Ludwig Wittgenstein points out 
in saying: “Der Tod ist kein Ereignis des Lebens. Den Tod erlebt man nicht.”8 It 
means that the only experience of death we have is the experience of losing other 
people, not our own life. Losing somebody who is especially important and close 
to us can bring a signifi cant change to our life or can even deprive our life of its 
subjective value to us, but our life will still be continued. We can ask whether 
the only tragedy of death is the loss of other people. One may argue that the 337 
old Elina could have been happy if all of the other people she cared about had 
not died before her. However, the main point of the novel is actually that Elina 
lived so long that she lost the ability to love, not only her loved ones. If it were 
the latter situation, her case would not be so different from the many other cases 
of people deprived of the will of life because of the loss of somebody important to 
them. If the only tragedy of death would be the loss of somebody else, not the loss 
of life itself, the death of people who have nobody to care about them would not be 
a tragedy at all – and yet it is the case that each death is a tragedy. 
To understand the tragic phenomena of death better, it could be useful to 
provide, after Józef Tischner, a distinction between the sense of death and the 
meaning of death. By a sense of death one understands an objective, common to 
all experience of its irrationality and its tragedy. By a meaning of death, on the 
other hand, one understands a subjective value to death. A sense of death speci-
4  V. Jankélévitch, op.cit., p. 16.
5  About this devastating feeling of emptiness wrote Tischner (J. Tischner, Świat ludzkiej 
nadziei (The World of Human Hope), Znak, Kraków 1994, p. 274 ff.).
6  S. Weil, An Anthology, S. Miles (ed.), New York 1986, p. 271.
7  Diogenes Laertios (Laërtius), Żywoty i poglądy słynnych fi lozofów (Lives and Opinions of 
Eminent Philosophers), Warszawa 1984, p. 645.
8  L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung, 
Frankfurt a. Main 2003, 6.4311, p. 109, in English translation: “Death is not an event in life: 
we do not live to experience death” (http://www.gutenberg.org/fi les/5740/5740-h/5740-h.htm).
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fi es a scope of possible meanings that can be given to a particular death which 
can be seen as heroic for instance (you can give special meaning to your death 
by sacrifi cing your life for life of others or for something more valuable than life, 
e.g. honour, friendship, homeland etc).9 “Death (...) as everything that is irra-
tional requires rationalization. A primary rationalization of death can be made 
by a metaphysical settlement. A secondary rationalization one makes by giving 
death a meaning”, as Tischner wrote.10 Both kinds of rationalization are aimed at 
overcoming the anxiety and fear of death that people experience. 
To be afraid of death can mean three different things: (1) to be afraid of some-
thing; (2) to be afraid of something unknown; (3) to be afraid of non-being. These 
three different feelings can be expressed by three different notions: fear, anxiety 
and despair that should be distinguished. Fear and anxiety can have the same 
origins, but they are not the same, as Paul Tillich writes.11 Fear always has a con-
crete, specifi ed subject that can be analyzed and challenged. Anxiety, by contrast, 
has no specifi ed subject, thus someone who experiences it remains helpless. Fear 
can be stimulating, it can give power to the one who experiences it – when we 
are faced with a lion that can eat us, our organism produces adrenaline and we 
can run as fast as we never could in other circumstances. Anxiety, on the other 
hand, can be paralyzing and can overpower the one who experiences it – when 
we feel anxious but we do not know the subject of our anxiety we do not know 
how to react, we are disoriented, we feel trapped, we do not move since we do not 
know where the danger might be. Trying to overcome anxiety we try to specify its 
subject in order to either transform anxiety into fear or to eliminate both when 
the specifi ed subject turns out not to be frightening. The anxiety which cannot 
be transformed into fear or reduced can bring about despair. One experiences 
despair not when the subject is unknown, but when there is no subject. Despair is 
the highest level of anxiety and occurs when the only subject of anxiety is anxiety 
itself. 
Taking into account this distinction, we can say that people can have fear of 
some kind of death or of some of the circumstances of death. For instance, one 
can have fear of painful death or a fear of agony which lasts half a year yet we 
cannot have fear of death itself. This is what Epicurus has in mind in telling us 
that we cannot be afraid of death since we are no more when it comes, meaning 
that we cannot experience and feel death by ourselves. Much more signifi cant is 
that we can also have a fear of some of the consequences of death. For instance, 
one can have fear of an early death which makes it impossible to pursue her plans 
and to complete her projects. One can consider death to be an evil because of what 
it deprives us of (because it brings to an end all the goods that life contains), as 
Thomas Nagel argues.12 In such a situation we are not afraid of the experience 
of dying or of being dead, but we are rather afraid of having no more experience. 
One understands here by death an impossibility of continuing life. The fact that 
9  J. Tischner, op.cit., p. 270 ff.
10  Ibidem, p. 282.
11  P. Tillich, Męstwo bycia (The Courage to Be), H. Bednarek (trans.), Poznań 1994, p. 42 ff.
12  T. Nagel, Death [in:] Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 1. See also 
J. Malczewski, O prywacyjnej koncepcji zła śmierci (On Privative Conception of Evil of Death), 
“Diametros” 11 (March 2007), pp. 1–9.
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“his life is over and there will never be any more of it”13 can be seen as a severe 
misfortune. Some can argue that an early death is a greater misfortune than 
the death of an old person, because the former deprives its subject of more goods 
(more possibilities of experience) than the latter. Giovanni Battista Pergolesi, a fa-
mous Italian composer, violinist and organist, author of one of the most touching 
Stabat Mater’s ever written, died at the age of 26. His death can be regarded as 
especially tragic when we think of what he might have written if he had reached 
the age of 88 like his compatriot Giuseppe Verdi. Giving a similar example of 
Keats who died at 24 and Tolstoy who died at 82, Nagel argues that we cannot 
compare the tragedy of death by measuring the quantity of experience. Although 
human beings have natural limits to their lifespan which usually does not exceed 
a hundred years, we always defi ne our existence as an essentially open-ended 
future.14 There is no natural limit, argues Nagel, of the experience that we can 
have. Therefore, every death at every age is a misfortune for its subject (the dead 
person) since the tragedy concerns the impossibility of the continuation of life, 
and not the amount of experiences left to experience or just experienced. Taking 
into account this point of view, Elina’s death at 337 was a misfortune. It may only 
seem that it was not because an average person reaches 80, but if people lived 
1000 years, her death at 337 would seem tragic too.
The only problem with this argumentation is that it does not take into ac-
count that the possible continuation of life is not an absolute positive value, so 
death as the impossibility of continuing life cannot be regarded as an absolute 
evil, as Nagel maintains. We can imagine that there are some people who feel 
satisfi ed and fulfi lled with what they have already achieved in their life and are 
not frightened of death. There can be people who grew old and became tired with 
new experiences, who have lost their curiosity for life and who have nothing more 
to achieve and wait for death. There can be people who have nothing to live for 
and who are longing for death. There can also be some who want to sacrifi ce their 
lives for some higher values and they would choose death by themselves. In all 
these situations, the fear of death is overcome by the secondary rationalization 
which gives death its meaning. Death can be desirable for us in some situations 
and for some special reasons. It could transpire that it would be better for us to 
die than to continue our life in some circumstances yet we cannot say that death 
is something good as such, but only that possibility of continuing is not always 
the highest value. 
Of course, most of us are never ready for any kind of death – as the words of 
one prayer say: “Lord, I am ready to follow you when you call me, but not this 
night.”15 Every night is the present night for us, thus every night (every hour, 
every minute and every second) we could ask to postpone the moment of death. 
However, even if we have a fear of some kind of death, of the consequences of 
death or its circumstances, we know what we are frightened of (the subject of 
our fear is specifi ed) and therefore we can challenge it. Our fear keeps us ready 
13  T. Nagel, op.cit., p. 7. 
14  Ibidem, pp. 9–10.
15  See J. Améry, O starzeniu się. Bunt i rezygnacja (Über das Altern. Revolt und Resigna-
tion. Hand an sich legen. Diskurs über den Freitod), B. Baran (trans.), Warszawa 2007, p. 130. 
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to fi ght – we can overcome many illnesses, we can avoid many causes of sudden 
death by being aware and avoiding risks. Finally, we are supported in our fi ght by 
medicine that can prevent many causes of early death and reduce pain. 
We can try to challenge death (e.g. we can survive a serious accident) but we 
cannot try to challenge mortality (the fact that we will die one day). Mortality is 
a natural condition of the human race as well as of all species that belong to the 
so-called animate nature. Nevertheless, consciousness of mortality can make us 
anxious. It brings us from the level of fear to the level of anxiety, since death is 
something that is unknown and unexperienced by us (something that cannot be 
known or experienced). At this level we are neither afraid of having no possibility 
of experience, nor of the state of having no experience (which could be the same 
as the state of unconsciousness which is not seen as bad as death) but we are 
afraid of the fact of the passing of everything that is alive. Every minute of our 
life passes away just as everything that can be valuable for us in our life vanishes 
and cannot be held forever. The essence of the feeling is expressed by Macbeth in 
his fabulous speech:
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
Creepes in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last Syllable of Recorded time:
And all our yesterdayes, haue lighted Fooles
The way to dusty death. Out, out, breefe Candle,
Life’s but a walking Shadow, a poore Player,
That struts and frets his houre vpon the Stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a Tale
Told by an Ideot, full of sound and fury
Signifying nothing, 
(William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act 5, scene 5, 19–28)16
Macbeth is not talking about “the misfortune of the impossibility of continu-
ing life,” he goes much deeper by setting the question of the sense of life and 
death. To shed more light on the problem, we can distinguish, after Paul Tillich, 
three main types of existential anxiety that human beings experience: anxiety 
of fate and death; anxiety of guilt and condemnation; anxiety of emptiness and 
meaninglessness.17 These three types of anxiety that may overlap each other are 
present with different intensity in our lives – usually one kind of anxiety is domi-
nant over the other ones. Tillich argues that his distinction corresponds with 
different periods of time in human history, where at the beginning people were 
mostly anxious of losing life. In the further period of our history, the anxiety of 
losing life was replaced by the anxiety of condemnation. Finally, in our times, the 
deepest anxiety seems to be the anxiety of absurdity (the lack of sense and mean-
ing of everything in the world and in our life). However, all types of existential 
anxiety mentioned above concern dealing with the same problem – the sense of 
death. Existential anxiety in all its kinds can only be overcome by the primary 
rationalization of death, i.e. by searching for its sense. If we fail to fi nd any sense 
16  W. Shakespeare, The Tragedie of Macbeth, The Project Gutenberg’s Etext of Shakespeare’s 
First Folio, http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext00/0ws3410.txt
17  P. Tillich, op.cit., p. 46 ff.
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of death we will fall into despair of emptiness and non-being which is something 
unimaginable (something that we cannot imagine). Such despair has no subject 
since emptiness and non-being are not subjects, nothing is not “unknown some-
thing” but a contradiction to something.18
Deconstruction and marginalization of death
When we refuse to take any metaphysical settlement that would give us 
a more or less convincing primary rationalization of death we seem to be com-
pletely lost. Nevertheless, people in our “disenchanted” world, using the phrase of 
Max Weber, do not fall into despair. Why? The answer is quite clear when we look 
at the attitude to the phenomena of death in our modern western culture. There 
are two characteristic, tightly connected features of the attitude to death in our 
times: (1) death is being challenged by scientifi c methods and (2) the conscious-
ness of mortality is being suppressed or displaced by our culture. Both methods 
fail to challenge the problem of death since both of them express our helplessness 
towards mortality and are rather the ways of escaping from the problem than 
overcoming it. Let me explain it more closely. 
New achievements in such areas as molecular biology and genetics are very 
advanced in the prolongation of life and gerontology, the study of ageing. This 
research is mainly focused on increasing life expectancy by challenging the bio-
chemical processes of ageing. New medical research increases both the quantity 
and quality of life and many people are able to expect not only longer but also 
more healthy and active lives.19 Since scientifi c efforts cannot overcome death, all 
scientifi c aspirations are aimed at making death predictable and to some extent 
preventable. Science failed to bring immortality to people but it tries to challenge 
death by taming it with medical and biological explanations that is a process 
called by Zygmunt Bauman “the deconstruction of death.”20 The modern decon-
18  Non-being can be understood, according to Aristotle, in four different ways: as contra-
diction to being (radical opposition, nothingness); as lack of being; as differential opposition 
(non-being means that something is not being but is something else); as relative opposition 
(non-being is conditioned by being and on the contrary), W. Stróżewski, Ontologia (Ontology), 
Kraków 2003, p. 171 ff.; idem, Istnienie i sens (Being and Sense), Kraków 2005, p. 424 ff.
19  Of course, it concerns only people who had the luck to be born in rich and highly de-
veloped parts of the world. The level of mortality, especially child mortality, varies to a great 
extent in different parts of the world. According to the United Nations Human Development 
Report, 10.7 million children every year do not reach their fi fth birthday; today someone living 
in Zambia has less chance of reaching the age of 30 than someone born in England in 1840; 
somebody born in Burkina Faso can expect to live 35 years fewer than somebody born in Japan, 
and somebody born in India can expect to live 14 years fewer than somebody born in the USA 
(Human Development Report 2005, pp. 3–25, http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/). Thus, 
you cannot expect neither similar quantity, nor quality of life among all the inhabitants of our 
world. As Jean Améry accurately notices, “if we are all equal in death,” it does not mean that 
“we are equal in dying” (J. Améry, op.cit., pp. 114–115). 
20  Z. Bauman, Śmierć i nieśmiertelność. O wielości strategii życia (Mortality, Immortality 
and Other Life Strategies), N. Leśniewski (trans.), Warszawa 1998, p. 156 ff.
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struction of death is aimed at making this phenomena absolutely explicable, com-
prehensible, deprived of any mysteriousness and limited to a natural, biological 
act. The scientifi c efforts of our times have replaced the primary metaphysical ra-
tionalization of death with naturalistic rationalization. This turn from metaphys-
ics to science in search for reliable, certain and universal answers also means 
a change of discourse from a justifi catory to an explanatory one. Our times are 
the times of belief in science and technological effi ciency in transforming nature 
and human beings. People’s deepest desire is to have control over nature and hu-
man life from beginning to end, including decisions about both. That what cannot 
be fully controlled is seen as a failure. Illnesses, ageing and death – all are seen 
as human failures in challenging nature, all are burdens for the society which 
hides them away from the public consciousness. 
Therefore, the tendency of naturalizing death is supported by another strong 
tendency of our times – marginalizing death, isolating it and keeping far from 
people’s life. Philippe Ariès describes this social phenomena of our times in the 
last chapter of the history of attitudes to death and dying, one of his major works. 
The title of the chapter is “Death the other way round” and it describes how death 
from a social, public event became something private and embarrassing in our 
times. In previous times, everybody died publicly, the death of an individual was 
a tragedy for the whole community. In modern times, death became exiled from 
a society and “in a city everything goes on just as nobody were dying”, writes 
Ariès.21 People have hidden death behind the closed doors of hospitals. Today, 
people usually die in much more convenient and painless ways but more often 
in loneliness and unconsciousness. Of course, everybody dies alone – on her own 
account, nobody can replace her in her dying – but whether people face it sup-
ported by their loved ones or in complete loneliness constitutes a considerable 
difference.22 People have developed, as Ariès writes, a new model of death – medi-
calised death and a new style of dying – in hospitals. It is quite characteristic that 
modern people have not developed any signifi cant symbol of death as in former 
times.23 The medical model determines our understanding of death, seen as a fail-
ure, negligence, as business lost.24 
The most interesting thing is that death has lost its natural meaning in our 
times. There is no such a thing as natural death any more. Each death is a fail-
ure of medicine, an external and radical interruption of our natural process of 
living. Our contemporary understanding of death is based (as with the whole of 
modern science) on Descartes’ mechanicistic theory of a life, as Max Scheler no-
tices. The theory says that death is the “termination of phenomena of conscious-
ness, produced by an external cause destroying bodily mechanism.”25 In former 
times, death was understood in terms other than the physical, it was understood 
21  P. Ariès, Człowiek i śmierć (L’Homme Devant la Mort), E. Bąkowska (trans.), Warszawa 
1989, p. 550.
22  Research results suggest that only one fourth of bereaved people were present when their 
close relatives were dying (ibidem, p. 560). 
23  M. Scheler, Cierpienie, śmierć, dalsze życie (Vom Sinns des Leidens. Vom Verrat der 
Freude. Tod und Fortleben), A. Węgrzycki (trans.), Warszawa 1994, p. 96. 
24  P. Ariès, op.cit., p. 575.
25  M. Scheler, op.cit., p. 99. 
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as something like a fading or an expiring because of the exhaustion of internal 
powers. Some ancient philosophers, such as Plato, also tried to use such biological 
terms in describing physical movement, an unsuccessful enterprise, and yet now, 
by contrast, one uses physical terms to explain biological death. It results in the 
situation that one sees each death just as a death caused by a shot from a pistol. 
Each death is unnatural, each death is an externally caused disruption of our 
bodily functions. It brings about confusion and is the main reason for today’s 
controversies about the defi nition of death. The main point of discussion is which 
processes have to be terminated to become dead.26 Death examined in scientifi c 
research became a complexity of different, separate processes (death of brain, 
death of heart and other organs can be distinguished) that can be, to a certain 
degree, technically manipulated. 
The deconstruction of death makes it trivial and forces people to concentrate 
on everything that helps us forget about its irrationality, that which cannot be 
covered by scientifi c research. Contemporary societies are constructed in a utili-
tarian manner, aimed at maximizing our preferences which are supposed to bring 
happiness, while minimizing misfortune and suffering. Such a utilitarian idea is 
based on consequential and end-result (teleological) reasoning but, actually, the 
idea of maximization is an aim itself. Thus, it is end-result thinking but without 
a specifi ed end. The main motive of people’s conduct is the idea of the endless 
maximization of preferences. Therefore, life is understood, by such thinkers as 
Nagel, as an open-ended plan which consists of an unlimited scope of possibilities. 
A death which deprives us of further possibilities is an irrational absolute cut-off 
point which breaks up the continuity of our life and is thus an absolute evil. 
Contemporary culture has displaced a consciousness of mortality with a mere 
knowledge of mortality based on a simple inductive judgment27: “(1) Socrates died; 
(2) X, Y (...) Z died; (3) all people are mortal.” We know the fact of the mortality of 
human beings and therefore we know that we will also die but knowing the fact of 
human mortality is something completely different from an intuition “I will die.” 
The fact that human beings are mortal is something natural, while an intuition 
of death is not, as Leszek Kołakowski points out.28 Nobody expressed it better 
than Leo Tolstoy in his magnifi cent and moving novel entitled The Death of Ivan 
Ilych. Ivan Ilych knew that he was dying, nevertheless “he could not grasp it.” He 
was familiar with the frequently used logical syllogism: “»Caius is a man, men 
are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal«.” This “had always seemed to him correct 
as applied to Caius, but certainly not as applied to himself” since he was not an 
abstract mortal man, he was a separate being, Vanya, who had his own experi-
ences, memories, emotions and thoughts and it simply could not be true for him 
that he ought to die.29  
26  See about it S.J. Youngner, R.M. Arnold, R. Schapiro (eds.), The Defi nition of Heath. 
Contemporary Controversies, The John Hopkins University Press, London 1999.
27  See M. Scheler, op.cit., p. 97. 
28  L. Kołakowski, Bóg nam nic nie jest dłużny. Krótka uwaga o religii Pascala i o duchu 
jansenizmu (God Owes Us Nothing. Short Remark on Pascal’s Religion and the Spirit of Jan-
senizm), I. Kania (trans.), Znak, Kraków 1994, p. 161. 
29  L. Tolstoy,  The Death of Ivan Ilych, trans. by Louise and Aylmer Maude, ReaderWorks, 
available online.  
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Consciousness of mortality – sense of death and meaning 
of life reconstructed
Let me now present some arguments showing the signifi cance of death as 
a part of human condition that can help us understand why rebuilding a deep 
consciousness of mortality in our culture is required. 
1. Life: development and diversification
Why do people die? Actually, scientists have no good answer as far as the 
evolutionary reasons for the ageing of human cells are concerned. There are only 
speculations. One of them says that human cells age and die because if it were not 
so, there would be no exchange of cells, no diversity and therefore no development 
in nature would be possible, the same being the case for the development of global 
civilization and culture. The necessary conditions of each kind of development are 
the following two contradictory factors: cooperation (which leads to unifi cation) 
and diversity, as Lévi-Strauss writes.30 On the one hand, people need to cooperate 
with each other to survive and develop civilisation yet to stimulate civilisation’s 
progress people need diversifi cation. The more diverse the players, the more prof-
itable the cooperation. However, each cooperation brings about the unifi cation of 
the subject of cooperation, so the longer parties cooperate, the less profi table it 
would be. Thus, if people’s lives were immortal, the cooperation would be extend-
ed into infi nity and would result with absolutely unity and therefore stagnation. 
If there were no death, there would be also no procreation which is the natu-
ral answer to death. Both mortality and natality, using the phrase of Hannah 
Arendt, are two sides of the same coin that complement one another. Natality and 
mortality are the most important strategies of diversifi cation that result in the 
generation of new levels of diversity and make any human development possible. 
Each person that is born and dies is different, absolutely unique, thus making 
our world so valuable and our life so intense. This is the fi rst reason which makes 
death a necessary part of life. As Scheler says, “death is a ‘sacrifi ce’ which organic 
individuals must suffer with regard to the reproduction of species.”31
2. Being alive
Everything that lives dies. Animate beings are those beings that can die in 
contrast to inanimate (inorganic) parts of nature such as stones, mountains, riv-
ers and wind. Inanimate things can also vanish or end but the difference is that 
their vanishing is relative, not absolute as with dying. The vanishing of inani-
mate beings is relative to coming into being of something else, writes Scheler and 
adds: “death represents itself as absolute vanishing of something that cannot be 
30  C. Lévi-Strauss, Antropologia strukturalna II (Anthropologie structurale deux), M. Falski 
(trans.), Wydawnictwo KR, Warszawa 2001, pp. 384–388.
31  M. Scheler, op.cit., p. 10; see also p. 15.
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considered in any way as origination of something different.”32 People die and 
people are born but there are not the same or replicable beings, somebody’s life 
is not a mere continuation of life of her ascendants. Nobody has to die to make 
room for a new human being in the world. We do not sacrifi ce our life for the lives 
of those to come in the future. The idea of mortality is a necessary condition of 
natality in the meaning of sacrifi ce of individual life for the life of species. As Max 
Scheler stresses: “an absolute phenomenon of death is connected with an essence 
of the animate”. Death belongs to an essence of life. Therefore we cannot under-
stand dying as being defeated by nature, dying is a part of nature to which we all 
belong as organic, animate beings. Dying is the essence of our being.
3. Being in time
Nagel writes that being alive means having the possibility to do certain 
things, to experience both bad and good things. However, we have to take into ac-
count that doing and experiencing is not a state but a process which is situated in 
time just as human beings are. Each experience and life activity is directed into 
changes and all changes depend on time and its fl ow. The fl ow of time determines 
our life which is passing away with every moment we experience. Scheler writes 
that “The essence of each life is its direction on death.”33 Human beings under-
stand their life as not only being in time but also as being in a specifi ed period 
of time which has its unspecifi ed (open, unknown) end. Whatever we plan in our 
life we consider it in time, our whole life and its certain rhythm is determined by 
the fact that we live in time, not in the present.34 It means that we can experience 
new things and that the events we have experienced are passing. Our experiences 
are not stuck into us as nails are in a wall (luckily!) and we are not stuck in our 
experiences. Our life is one of permanent change and movement which presup-
poses dying and death. Human beings are beings in time which means that they 
are mortal beings. 
4. Meaning of the life and identity
If we want to understand what a human being is, we have to accept her mor-
tality. Yet this acceptance means that we have to search for its rationalisation 
in giving sense to someone’s death one is also giving a meaning to her life. As 
Scheler says, death cannot be understood as some external frames to a picture 
of our life.35 These are frames that are the part of the picture. Thus, to see the 
whole picture and to be able to understand its meaning we have to see it with 
its frames. Without them, the picture remains incomplete. Of course, it does not 
mean that we do not feel our own life as an integral thing, a totality and that 
only other people can see our life as a wholeness after our death. On the con-
32  Ibidem, p. 87.
33  Ibidem, p. 81.
34  See V. Jankélévitch, op.cit., p. 21
35  M. Scheler, op.cit., p. 84.
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trary, it means that having the consciousness of our own mortality (not only of 
the fact of natural mortality of human beings, but intuition of our own death), we 
can understand our being as an entire life, as some kind of unity placed in time. 
Our life is an entire unity in each moment since it is closed in time, however, 
we do not know when exactly it will end. Contemporary people have lost their 
feeling of unity and the entirety of their lives since they do not see their life in 
the perspective of death. They rather prefer to see their lives as a never-ending 
process of the maximization of their preferences or a set of different, separate ex-
periences without any natural limit. But only passing and death can make each 
moment of our life unique and valuable. If we were not able to place our life and 
experiences in a certain time, there would be no continuity. Without frames of 
death, our picture of life and of ourselves disintegrates and falls to pieces. Only 
one’s own death makes one’s own life picture complete, and each moment of her 
life unrepeatable and meaningful part of the whole. Death determines the un-
derstanding of our own life and of ourselves, it shapes our identity. Somebody’s 
love and death are the deepest and most moving experience we can have since 
they both give us truth, the truth about human beings. Thus, death should be 
always one’s own death that results from each moment of one’s own life and from 
the entire life. Nobody expressed this more insightfully than Rainer Maria Rilke 
in his love poem to God:
O Herr, gib jedem seinen eignen Tod.
Das Sterben, das aus jenem Leben geht, 
darin er Liebe hatte, Sinn und Not 
(R.M. Rilke, O Herr, gib jedem seinen eignen Tod, 15.4.1903, Viareggio)36 
5. Freedom, happiness and a definite loss
Let me now turn to the question of whether death limits our freedom. One 
may argue that it does, on the grounds that it limits the number of situations in 
which we can choose among various alternatives. However, I fi nd this argument 
unconvincing. I think that if we were immortal and therefore if we could repeat 
our choices an infi nite number of times, these choices would be deprived of any 
tragic element, that is to say: we would not have to sacrifi ce one alternative for 
the sake of another, as all the alternatives would be realizable in a more or less 
distant future. In my view, this element of sacrifi ce is an important aspect of free-
dom: without this element, it would stop being the value as we know it. 
However, on the other hand, one may question if anybody may really enjoy 
something that one has to inevitably lose. There are three possible ways of an ap-
proach to happiness: (1) one enjoys happiness, not being aware that she can lose 
it; (2) one enjoys happiness but already being aware that she can lose it; (3) one 
cannot enjoy happiness anymore because the consciousness of the loss of it is so 
36  “Oh Lord, award to each his fi tting death: 
 a dying that distills his very life
with all its drive and love and breath,”
trans. by Walter A. Aue (http://myweb.dal.ca/waue/Trans/Rilke-Stunden.html).
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intense that it makes happiness impossible. These three approaches to happiness 
can be generally assigned to three periods in our life. The fi rst one is childhood 
when one can enjoy happiness without taking into account that this happiness 
is something very fragile and short-lived. However, in this time we are not fully 
conscious about what we experience (that this is happiness that we feel) and we 
are not conscious about a real value of this happiness. To be able to estimate fully 
the value of happiness, we must experience its loss or at least the possibility of its 
loss. We know how much something is worth when we know or can imagine how it 
would be if we were deprived of what we value. How could we appreciate youth if 
we were not to lose it? How could we say that life has such a great value if it were 
impossible to lose it and if we were keeping it without any special effort? Human 
beings alone are probably the only ones amongst all animals who are fully con-
scious about their mortality, the temporality of the existence and the passing 
away of all of the material things in the world. Other animals live in a permanent 
now and one may say, after Friedrich Nietzsche, that they are happy because 
they do not know that they are approaching death with each second of their life. 
However, is it a state of happiness that would satisfy all of us? I think that most of 
us would choose conscious life at all costs. Of course, there are some unhappy or 
sometimes deeply disturbed people who cannot enjoy something when prevented 
by their consciousness of its inevitable loss. Yet if there would be no pain, no 
death or no consciousness of any loss, there would be no place for anything we val-
ue in our life. There would be no love without pain and death as Scheler writes.37 
Brave New World, described in the brilliant book by Aldous Huxley, seems to be 
a very happy place where no one suffers, but this is also a place deprived of the 
deepest human feelings and emotions. This brings one of the heroes of the book, 
the Savage, to revolt – claiming “the right to be unhappy.”38
6. Eternity
We would not be able to understand the human condition and our lives without 
death and the idea of time passing. It brings us to the question of what one can 
then mean by eternity. “The fi rst condition of life after death is death itself,”39 
37  M. Scheler, op.cit., p. 18. See also J. Ratzinger, Śmierć i życie wieczne (Eschatologie – Tod 
und ewiges Leben), M. Węcławski (trans.), Warszawa 2005, p. 92 ff. 
38  I quote here the whole passage of this magnifi cent book where the Savage speaks to the 
Mustapha Mond, one of the Resident World Controllers: 
“I don’t want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want 
goodness. I want sin.”
“In fact,” said Mustapha Mond, “you’re claiming the right to be unhappy.” 
“All right then,” said the Savage defi antly, “I’m claiming the right to be unhappy.” 
“Not to mention the right to grow old and ugly and impotent; the right to have syphilis and 
cancer; the right to have too little to eat; the right to be lousy; the right to live in constant ap-
prehension of what may happen tomorrow; the right to catch typhoid; the right to be tortured 
by unspeakable pains of every kind.” There was a long silence. 
“I claim them all,’ ” said the Savage at last.” 
(http://www.hedweb.com/huxley/bnw/seventeen.html).
39  M. Scheler, op.cit., p. 105.
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Scheler writes. When people consider the idea of eternal life, such an eternity 
cannot be understood as life without end, but rather as a completely different kind 
of life which cannot be measured in time, existence beyond time. Furthermore, 
as Wittgenstein says: “Wenn man unter Ewigkeit nicht unendliche Zeitdauer, 
sondern Unzeitlichkeit versteht, dann lebt der ewig, der in der Gegenwart lebt.”40 
In other words, one can understand eternity as the eternal present which means 
being beyond past, present and future, and knowing no passing of time. It means 
that when we think of eternal life we do not want to keep our life with all its 
activities forever, the only thing that we are sometimes longing for is to keep the 
particular moments of our life or to make them last forever. How unfortunate 
are those who have no such moments to which they can call in Faust’s words: 
“Verweile doch! Du bist so schön!...”41 These are the moments of joy about which 
Nietzsche sings in his drunken song: “Lust will al ler Dinge Ewigkeit, wil l  tie-
fe, tiefe Ewigkeit!”42
Concluding remarks
Of course, it is diffi cult to agree with Epicurus or Cicero claims that death is 
a good thing or at least not a bad thing since it does not make us suffer when it 
comes. Death remains a bad thing since it brings to us the feeling of emptiness 
that cannot be fi lled by any speculation. It also makes us frustrated by showing 
how vulnerable our human existence is (the human being is “a thinking reed” as 
Pascal says). Death is a tragedy, but a signifi cant tragedy which poses a signifi -
cant question of its sense and which gives a special meaning to life. Death is an 
important source experience of our life that shapes our identities and makes our 
lives meaningful in each moment that cannot be repeated any more. Living im-
mortally, people would have no strong motivation to pursue their life projects, to 
keep relationships, to love, to forgive or to hate etc. – immortality results in abso-
lute, never-ending boredom. It would also result in complete unifi cation and stag-
nation, making any natural and cultural development impossible. Being alive 
means to be mortal and to pass on. To live is to experience and act and this can 
be possible only in the frames of time. Life can be fully understood only within 
its mortal frames, and death should be understood as something that results 
from life. It gives us space for freedom and makes our free choices signifi cant. 
Consciousness of death and any kind of inevitable loss in our life makes our life 
40  L. Wittgenstein, op.cit., 6.4311, p. 109, in English: “If we take eternity to mean not infi nite 
temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present,” 
http://www.gutenberg.org/fi les/5740/5740-h/5740-h.htm
41  “Ach, still delay – though art so fair!” – translated into English by Bayard Taylor (http://
www.gutenberg.org/fi les/14591/14591-h/14591-h.htm.)
42  F. Nietzsche, G. Colli, M. Montinari (Hrsg.), Also sprach Zaratustra, Kritische Studien-
ausgabe, de Gruyter, Berlin 1999, p. 403. “Joys want the eternity of ALL things, they WANT 
DEEP, PROFOUND ETERNITY!” – trans. into English by T. Common: (http://www.gutenberg.
org/fi les/1998/1998-h/1998-h.htm#2H_4_0087).
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valuable and brings us full enjoyment. The rare moments of full enjoyment – our 
joys – are those ones that are worth keeping forever, those that deserve eternity. 
If we accept the signifi cance of death as a condition of life, we cannot reject 
the search for its primary rationalization which cannot be replaced with any 
naturalistic explanation. Even if we are unable to fi nd absolute and certain an-
swers, we cannot stop asking. Death is not a secret that has to be discovered, 
as Jankélévitch says, it is a mystery. One could add, quoting Kołakowski: “If we 
could have answered this, our world would have resembled a multiplication table 
for a long time. And then you would have seen how much worse it would have 
been than what we have.”43
43  L. Kołakowski, Klucz niebieski albo Opowieści budujące z historii świętej zebrane ku po-
uczeniu i przestrodze (The Key to Heaven or Underpinning Stories for Admonition and Warning), 
Warszawa 1965, p. 104. 
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